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Abstract
Background: Health officials face particular challenges in communicating with the public about emerging
infectious diseases of unknown severity such as the 2009 H1N1(swine ‘flu) pandemic (pH1N1). Statements intended
to create awareness and convey the seriousness of infectious disease threats can draw accusations of scare-
mongering, while officials can be accused of complacency if such statements are not made. In these
communication contexts, news journalists, often reliant on official sources to understand issues are pivotal in
selecting and emphasising aspects of official discourse deemed sufficiently newsworthy to present to the public.
This paper presents a case-study of news communication regarding the emergence of pH1N1.
Methods: We conducted a content analysis of all television news items about pH1N1. We examined news and
current affairs items broadcast on 5 free-to-air Sydney television channels between April 25 2009 (the first report)
and October 9 (prior to the vaccine release) for statements about [1] the seriousness of the disease [2] how the
public could minimise contagion [3] government responses to emerging information.
Results: pH1N1 was the leading health story for eight of 24 weeks and was in the top 5 for 20 weeks. 353 news
items were identified, yielding 3086 statements for analysis, with 63.4% related to the seriousness of the situation,
12.9% providing advice for viewers and 23.6% involving assurances from government. Coverage focused on
infection/mortality rates, the spread of the virus, the need for public calm, the vulnerability of particular groups,
direct and indirect advice for viewers, and government reassurances about effective management.
Conclusions: Overall, the reporting of 2009 pH1N1 in Sydney, Australia was generally non-alarmist, while
conveying that pH1N1 was potentially serious. Daily infection rate tallies and commentary on changes in the
pandemic alert level were seldom contextualised to assist viewers in understanding personal relevance.
Suggestions are made about how future reporting of emerging infectious diseases could be enhanced.
Background
In recent years, Australians have been exposed to a
range of large-scale news coverage and health promo-
tion campaigns about communicable disease. These
have included seasonal influenza advisories; campaigns
promoting immunisation for vaccine-preventable
diseases [1]; traveller vaccination messages; sexually-
transmitted disease prevention campaigns [2], including
human papilloma virus vaccine to prevent cervical
cancer [3]; HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B and C prevention.
With the exception of HIV/AIDS and sexually-trans-
mitted diseases, each of these has a vaccine and clear
directives about how to avoid infection, forming the
central communicative focus of such campaigns.
The WHO-declared global pH1N1 (swine ‘flu) pan-
demic of 2009 has attracted research attention from vir-
ologists and infectious disease specialists [4-10], but less
from communication scholars [11-14]. From the first
reports of Mexican cases in late April 2009, what would
become sustained Australian reportage rapidly turned to
the likelihood of Australian cases involving perhaps epi-
demic and high mortality numbers. Australians were
exposed to daily news featuring the country’ss e n i o r
health officials and an array of infectious disease experts,
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complex trajectories and virulence of the disease in the
context of news production cultures characterised by
seven second sound-bites [15] and an appetite for
unambiguous, easily understood information.
For the first five months of the pH1N1 epidemic no
vaccine was available. As such, this period represents a
prolonged example of news coverage of an uncertain
risk with the potential to become a major threat to pub-
lic health and where medical science had no protection
to offer, high-lighting once again the context-specific
nature of any risk or crisis communication strategy [16].
Knowledge of the H1N1 virus was characterised by
uncertainty about the potential seriousness of the threat
and actions that individuals and governments should
take. This marked the disease and public news discourse
about it as a compelling case study in the high-profile
communication of uncertainty.
Prior to pH1N1, Australia had experienced large-scale
warning campaigns delivered principally via news
reports and government advisories in relation to SARS
(November 2002-July 2003) [17] and avian influenza
(mainly H5N1) (May 2005 - 2006) [18]. Reportage had
much in common with that for H1N1: they were “for-
eign” in origin; they threatened to arrive on Australia’s
shores; their endemicity and expected virulence were
uncertain; and a prudent suite of behaviours or govern-
ment actions were not prescribed as ways of minimising
infection [19]. Together, these common features -
coupled with the failure of these epidemics to materia-
lise in Australia and the failure of the public to develop
any significant concern [20] - lent a further degree of
interest to pH1N1 and the way in which the govern-
ment, health authorities and news media tried to com-
municate risk.
Media risk research highlights how risk is communi-
cated to the public: disseminating risk information; gen-
erating and determining public acceptability of different
risks; framing responsibility for [21] and motivating
action regarding risks; and seeking to explore differences
between the communication of voluntary and involun-
tary risks [22]. Repeated surveys have found around 40%
of the public follow health news, with news on influenza
being one of the most closely-followed health issues
[23]. Studies of the impact of public warnings about
emerging diseases with uncertain trajectories have
shown that they can attract disproportionate news cov-
erage relative to the burden of disease arising from
them [24]. While some studies report that this coverage
is often episodic, sensational and contains little informa-
tion useful to the public in deciding what they should
do [25,26], others find that it can be mostly “neutral”
and that it can cycle through alarmist reports which
tend to calm as more information emerges [11]. Despite
perceptions of “excessive” news coverage, personal con-
cern and knowledge of such diseases can remain low
[27] but a significant proportion engage in increased
infection control measures such as hand-washing [28].
Media-risk research demonstrates that reportage is
often governed by journalistic values and organisational
norms and has little parallel to actual threat [29-31].
Reporters tend to adopt reporting frames provided by
dominant institutions and their key actors who are per-
ceived by journalists as legitimate sources [32]. In the
face of hundreds of conflicting findings Bakir (2010)
rhetorically asks whether there is anything different in
risk reportage compared to other types of news. One
answer, she says, ‘lies in the uncertainty and value
judgements inherent in risk issues, and the diverging
interpretations they generate’ (pg 7). Indeed, as the
Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Health Communication
put it, the confusion and uncertainty about the pH1N1
threat was ‘communicable chaos’ [12] (pg 413).
No studies appear to have been published on how
emerging diseases are treated by television news. This is
a significant absence, because television news on a typi-
cal weeknight in Australia can reach over a fifth of the
population [33], while the highest state-specific newspa-
per reaches 1.3 million [34].
Methods
Since May 2005, the Australian Health News Research
Collaboration has recorded and categorised all news,
current affairs and ‘infotainment’ programmes related to
health and medicine on Sydney free-to-air television sta-
tions [15]. We searched the AHNRC database and
included all items tagged with ‘H1N1’ or ‘swine flu’ in
the period April 25, 2009 (the first mention) until Octo-
ber 9 2009. All stories were video clips which were used
for the content analysis reported here.
Using a list of content categories that emerged pro-
gressively from the content as the pH1N1 story evolved,
two authors (AF and MI) compared coding on a set of
15 random clips that each watched and coded individu-
ally. After resolving any coding differences and agreeing
upon how particular items should be handled, they
coded the remainder of the items. These categories
related to statements made regarding [1] the seriousness
of H1N1, [2] recommended actions viewers were advised
to take about avoiding contracting or spreading pH1N1,
and [3] reassurances that the government was handling
the situation. A statement was any direct (X said “Y”)o r
attributed ("X said that...”) quote by the journalists or
news actors featured in each item. A test of inter-coder
reliability produced a Kappa statistic of 0.63, indicating
a good level of agreement [35].
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A total of 353 news stories were identified, containing
3,086 statements related to the three key areas of
inquiry. During the 24 weeks reported here, pH1N1 was
the leading health story for eight weeks and for
20 weeks remained in the top five most frequently
reported health stories. We also note that the virus was
rarely referred to by the name pH1N1 during the cover-
age and instead, was routinely termed swine ‘flu. When
reporting exact quotes we have therefore retained the
term swine ‘flu.
1) Seriousness Of pH1N1
Of all statements, 63.4% (n = 1,958/3,086) related to the
seriousness of pH1N1 (Table 1). This was communi-
cated via four recurring stories: (i) daily tallies of infec-
tion and mortality; (ii) descriptions of spread of the
virus; (iii) the need for calm responses; and (iv) the vul-
nerability of particular groups. We briefly summarise
other statements which did not comprise significant
proportions of the coverage, but may have been impor-
tant to those who incidentally saw some news stories.
This included similarities between pH1N1 and other
viruses, government management plans, and the need
for systems covering diagnosis and the anticipated
vaccine roll out.
(i) Infection and mortality tallies
The most common (42.7%, n = 836/1,958) statements
communicating the seriousness of H1N1 concerned
infection and mortality rates. These generally conveyed
that infection rates were serious (“Australia is the most
severely-affected country in the Asia Pacific with nearly
12,000 cases: more than 10% of the global total”), uni-
versal and spreading (“Cases have now been confirmed
in Mexico, the US, Canada, Spain, the UK, Israel, New
Zealand, Germany, Austria and Costa Rica, with cases
suspected in South Africa”) and could result in hospitali-
sation (7.7%, n = 64/836; “...nearly half of the 123
patients hospitalised around Australia with swine ‘flu
are in intensive care...”).
Statements about deaths initially concerned Mexico,
but switched to Australia once local deaths occurred
among those with underlying medical conditions (“A
second Victorian has died ... She was 50 years old and
had cancer...”). This message changed to encompass
people of all ages, as well as risk groups outside those
traditionally vulnerable to seasonal ‘flu (“they’re young,
healthy and at risk of dying from swine ‘flu: several hos-
pitals are now reporting cases of otherwise fit people end-
ing up in intensive care...”). A key concern was accuracy
of predictions and the salience given to uncertainty
regarding how high these rates might climb (“It’s really
i m p o s s i b l et oh o n e s t l ym a k et hose predictions. The fear
of course in the international community is that it could
get very bad, very quickly...”).
(ii) Describing the speed and spread of the virus
Coverage also referred to the spread using descriptive
language punctuated by epidemiological terms (11.3%, n
= 221/1,958). The WHO declared an official pandemic
on June 11, 2009 (“I have therefore decided to raise the
level of influenza pandemic alert from phase 5 to phase 6.
The world is now at the start of the 2009 influenza pan-
demic.”). Statements provided commentary that sug-
gested multiple, rapidly-spreading outbreaks which were
difficult to contain ("swine ‘flu has been declared unstop-
pable”). Descriptions often suggested uncertainty to view-
ers: for example, some organisations cancelled public
events (”The grand prix swimming meet won’t go ahead
in Melbourne later this month as sports administrators
there and elsewhere take pre-emptive action to stop the
virus spreading”), only to be told by the government this
was unnecessary (“I would urge those who are organising
events to make sure that their decisions are based on
medical advice”). Other events went ahead as planned
(”tonight’s [football] match ...will go ahead, but without
Queensland’s State of Origin players, who are in quaran-
tine after one of their number tested positive”)a l b e i tw i t h
some confusion as to whether this was appropriate
(”players say measures to stop the virus spreading are dis-
ruptive but necessary” versus “some health experts think
quarantining the players is an over-reaction.”)
(iii) The need for calm responses from the public
Despite acknowledgement of uncertainty, health authori-
ties sought to reassure viewers of the importance of
Table 1 Statements concerning the seriousness of H1N1
Statements N (%)
Infection and mortality rates 836 42.7
Outbreaks, pandemics, the quick spread of the virus or
an inability to contain it
221 11.3
Statements meant to calm any panic and reassure the
viewer
151 7.7
Statements concerning particular risk groups (e.g.
pregnant women, people with underlying health
conditions etc.)
145 7.4
Comparisons with other viruses (e.g. SARS, seasonal flu,
1918 pandemic)
135 6.8
Containment measures (e.g. border control, quarantine,
school closures, sporting cancellations)
101 5.1
Government Pandemic Preparedness Plan 86 4.4
Changes to WHO or Australian government alert levels 76 3.9
Vulnerability to H1N1 (e.g. lack of immunity, called
‘potentially deadly virus’, everybody at risk)
64 3.3
Vaccine (e.g. need for a vaccine, testing and rollout of
vaccine)
61 3.1
Testing and diagnosis of H1N1 strain 58 3.0
Other 24 1.2
TOTAL 1,958 100.0
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alarm or anxiety in the community ... so I think let’s
keep perspective on this”). Among all reassuring state-
m e n t sa c r o s st h e3q u e s t i o n s( n=1 8 2 ) ,3 4 . 1 %( n=6 2 /
182) stated that the virus was not as severe as first
feared; 20.3% (n = 37/182) were statements from health
authorities about their confidence in the pandemic
preparedness plan; 14.8% (n = 27/182) were indirect
statements that implied the level of fear was dispropor-
tionate; and 13.7% (n = 25/182) were direct entreaties
for the public to not panic. While some statements are
necessarily time dependent, collectively they nevertheless
reflect the continuous nature of the reassuring messages
present throughout the sample period.
(iv) Vulnerability of particular groups
Several statements implied only particular groups were
vulnerable (7.4%, n = 145/1,958), while others implied
that everyone was at risk (3.3%, n = 64/1,958). Those
with underlying health conditions were considered parti-
cularly at risk and in need of anti-viral medication (“...
the ‘flu can have severe outcomes for some people with
existing conditions ... those conditions include morbid
obesity, cardiovascular, renal and respiratory diseases”),
as were pregnant women (“..the sharp increase in the
number of pregnant women in intensive care, six are
now on life support with swine flu, most have had their
babies delivered prematurely...”). Yet other statements
implied that infection did not match previous patterns,
making everybody vulnerable to poor outcomes (“...
because of a lack of immunity in the community we are
seeing more serious disease in people that were pre-
viously well...”).
It was therefore unclear whether everyone was vulner-
able to infection and poor outcomes, including those
who were well and not part of the usual high-risk
groups, or whether everyone was vulnerable to infection
but only some groups vulnerable to poor outcomes.
However, as time went on and more became known
about the illness, health authority messages sought to
clarify uncertainty ("the important thing is to say that
mostly people have the normal experience with the ‘flu
and will be fine... What we’re looking for is people with
underlying medical conditions that suddenly get worse,
or ordinary people that’ve not got other conditions that
start to deteriorate”).
(v) Other information
The seriousness of pH1N1 was also communicated via
comparisons with other viruses such as SARS, avian and
seasonal ‘flu. Yet there was disagreement as to whether
pH1N1 was less severe (“...we’ve got 148 confirmed cases
of pH1N1 globally, we have over 8.5 thousand seasonal
influenza, human influenza every winter. We need to put
this in perspective...”), more severe (“infectious diseases
experts say the threat is worse than SARS or the bird
‘flu...”) or similar to other familiar viruses (“...the next
few days will show whether this is just another ‘flu strain
that happens to have swine and avian elements, or
whether indeed it is a significant killer ‘flu...”).
2) Advice And Recommended Actions For Viewers
In more than one third of stories (n = 131/353 - 37%)
direct or indirect advice was given on what viewers
could do to prevent spreading infection (table 2). How-
ever, these statements accounted for just 12.9% (n =
399/3,086) of all statements. Just over a quarter (27.8%,
n = 111/399) focused on basic personal hygiene, another
quarter related to preventing infection by being mindful
of issues of proximity (27.8%, n = 111/399) and a fifth
advised seeing a doctor and seeking further information
(20.6%, n = 82/399)..
Conflicting advice
Of all statements (n = 399) concerning advice on what
to do just 3.5% provided conflicting or unclear informa-
tion. This could involve government health authorities
disagreeing (“It h i n ki t ’s prudent that all households
think about their readiness....” versus “there is no need at
this point for people to start thinking about those pre-
parations...” in the same bulletin), or unclear advice con-
cerning face-masks (e.g. “pregnant women are being
advised to wear face-masks in public...” versus “we don’t
all need to be donning masks. The people that should be
wearing masks, whether it’s swine ‘flu, seasonal influenza
or any kind of cold virus, are the people that have the
symptoms...”) yet many clips featured imagery of the
public wearing masks, while not being pregnant or
apparently symptomatic. Likewise, people were advised
to respect quarantine measures, but some news actors
did not model this behaviour (“Senator Fielding has
defied calls to stay at home despite having potentially
been exposed to swine ‘flu...” and “swine flu victim Kar-
michael Hunt will play for the Broncos against the Bull-
dogs tonight in Brisbane”). Yet the uncertainty about
Table 2 direct and indirect advice to viewers
Statements N (%)
Look after basic hygiene (e.g. wash hands, cover your
mouth when you cough etc)
111 27.8
Help prevent the spread of infection (e.g. stay home if you
are sick, avoid crowds, defer non-essential travel, respect
quarantine, keep sick children home etc.)
111 27.8
Seek credible information, see a doctor and/or take
medication as advised
82 20.6
Consider a vaccine* 38 9.5
Be alert if you belong a particular risk group 35 8.8
Other 22 5.6
TOTAL 399 100.0
*Note: the H1N1 vaccine became more prominent in coverage occurring
outside the time period reported here.
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are doing to a large extent all they can, they’re seeking
medical advice, which is often conflicting unfortunately,
and following the advice of the experts and that’s really
all they can do, shy of shutting down an entire sport”).
These conflicting statements were, however, a very small
proportion of the advice offered to viewers.
3) Reassurance That Government Was Handling The
Situation
Of all statements recorded, 23.6% (n = 729/3,086)
assured viewers that the government was handling the
situation by elaborating on its current and proposed
actions (Table 3).
About a third of these statements (29.8%, n = 217/
729) referred to the immediate need for the Govern-
ment to develop, test and then distribute a vaccine start-
ing with priority groups (“we will purchase ... doses to
cover 10 million people based on the current expert
advice that this is sufficient to contain the spread of the
disease”).
A quarter of these statements (25.9%, n = 189/729)
reassured the public that the government was putting
significant effort into border control measures designed
to prevent pH1N1 entering Australia, and following up
and containing detected infection. These statements
generally concerned quarantine measures (“extra quar-
antine measures were today instituted for passengers
arriving from overseas, with medical staff deployed at
airports...”), the use of thermal imaging at airports or
statements about new measures and ongoing monitoring
of the situation (“...the Governor-General has signed off
on sweeping new detention and surveillance powers in
case the authorities need to act quickly...”).
Many statements concerned the official pandemic pre-
paredness plan [36] (17.3%, n = 126/729) and the Gov-
ernment’s willingness to take action (”this is a serious
matter, the government takes it seriously, all necessary
resources will be deployed to meet the threat, calibrated
to how it unfolds”), assurances about communication
between the government and health authorities (“we’ve
taken [the Chief Medical Officer’s] advice and we will
continue to take his advice...”) and statements that the
plan was an effective tool and that the required services
were on standby (“we have a very well-developed plan
between the states and territories ...we’ve got a very
strong health system, our GPs and emergency depart-
ments are well-informed with how to deal with presenta-
tions if the matter becomes more serious... “).
These assurances were accompanied by acknowledg-
ment of uncertainty, including the handling of a cruise
ship with infected crew on board (“more than a thou-
sand passengers are in lock-down tonight, stuck on a
cruise liner in Sydney harbour because of a swine ‘flu
scare”) and the ensuing confusion when some passen-
gers were allowed to disembark and others weren’t( ”I
think the response was complicated by both the Com-
monwealth and New South Wales, and I think that in
the future we need to learn to integrate our response..”).
News actors
O fa l ls t a t e m e n t s ,t h em a j o r i t yw e r em a d eb yr e p o r t e r s
(53.6, n = 1,653/3,086); a further 21.5% (n = 662/3,086)
by representatives of the government, including their
medical officers; and 12.2% (n = 376/3,086) by public
health and infectious disease experts. The remaining
12.8% (n = 395/3,086) were a combination of vox populi
statements and comments from overseas officials, ath-
letes or other stakeholders.
Discussion
pH1N1 sustained large-scale news coverage over many
months, a media focus commensurate with the serious-
ness with which major health organisations and govern-
ments approached the disease. Despite the uncertainty
surrounding the virus, statements made about pH1N1
were generally non-alarmist and reassuring, in keeping
with findings related to newspaper coverage [37]. As
with all studies focused on the content of news texts
alone, a limitation of this study is that we are unable to
draw any conclusions about the impact of coverage on
audiences. In using statements as the unit of analysis we
also acknowledge that conclusions cannot be drawn
about individual news stories in context. However, we
do find areas for consideration regarding the messages
potentially taken away by news consumers.
The emerging pandemic saw reportage fuelled by the
daily release by the WHO and Australian government of
data on new infections and deaths [38,39]. The volume,
duration and much of the content of the coverage was
such that the public could hardly avoid concluding that
the disease was serious enough to warrant the
Table 3 Reassurance through government action
Statements n (%)
Vaccine (e.g. production, testing and roll-out; advice about
priority groups etc)
217 29.8
Border control and containment measures (e.g. quarantine,
thermal imagery, health declaration cards)
189 25.9
Government pandemic preparedness plan and alert level 126 17.3
Administration of the anti-viral stockpile 45 6.2
Closures of public areas and postponement of public
events
42 5.8
Testing and diagnosis of the H1N1 strain 38 5.2
Advise the public to remain calm 26 3.6
Identification of risk-groups 22 3.0
Other 24 3.3
TOTAL 729 100.0
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was that pH1N1 might have been shaping to be “the big
one”: a pandemic that could threaten many lives. While
Australia and the world saw relatively few deaths, the
possibility that this might change underscored the
enduring media attention and government vigilance.
This, combined with the audience’s experience of other
prominent health campaigns in recent years, may have
created audience expectations that reportage would
include information of a less “banal” nature on impor-
tant practical strategies for risk reduction.
Health officials openly acknowledged the uncertainty
regarding how the pandemic might unfold, yet such
statements were accompanied by authoritative reassur-
ance that high-level preparedness existed if worst-case
scenarios eventuated: 17% of the government’sr e a s s u r -
ing statements confirmed they had an effective plan, a
stockpile of medication and the will to take action as
necessary. Viewers were often reminded to seek further
advice by visiting the government website, calling the
information line or contacting a doctor.
But beyond advice that the public should remain alert
and keep informed, and that the government was well
prepared, few clear directives were given on what view-
ers should actually do themselves. Routine advice that
mirrored advice for reducing contagion from common
colds and ‘flu was given regarding basic hygiene (e.g.
hand-washing, covering mouth when coughing, etc) and
containing the spread of infection (e.g. staying at home
with ‘flu-like symptoms, deferring non-essential travel,
adhering to quarantine associated with school closures,
etc.) - but overall this accounted for only 13% of all
statements.
This low key and relatively infrequent advice may have
imbued viewers with a sense that pH1N1 was nothing
out of the ordinary and helped prevent undue alarm
arising. Yet occasional news incidents which belied any
sense of banal risk may have fomented some dissonance
in viewers. While such items did not make up the bulk
of the reportage, they risked creating alarm in viewers
who may have only seen occasional news stories. Early
in the reporting period, a cruise ship with infected pas-
sengers and crew was reported over several days, with
undertones that it was a potential conduit for the virus
to spread into different Australian cities. Items contain-
ing contradictory risk information sometimes were
broadcast within the same news bulletin (e.g. a lead
news item that the WHO had declared a pandemic,
adjacent to a sports news story about a recently infected
footballer who had been cleared to play; footballers
together in a spa adjacent to a story about the cancella-
tion of a national elite swimming event; Government
ministers talking about increased airport measures, with
vox populi of disembarking passengers saying they had
experienced no border control screening etc.). These
inconsistencies had the potential to undermine the gov-
ernment’s assurances that everything was under control
but they may also have encouraged viewers to seek out
more information about the disease.
Other than the inconsistencies described - a product
of different reactions and responses to the risk posed by
pH1N1 in the community - we saw little to no evidence
of editorial effort to sensationalise reportage by, for
example, highlighting examples of community anxiety or
the views of any “maverick” experts arguing that the
assurances being given were irresponsible or, conversely,
that the seriousness with which the threat was being
taken and the public health measures put in place had
been exaggerated. For the most part, reports were mod-
erate or simply updating previous news.
It is also important to recognise the limitations of
accusing the media of sensationalism or lack of balance
in that it risks obscuring rather than clarifying the pro-
cesses that influence media coverage. For example, as
Kitiznger notes [40]determining what constitutes alarm-
ing or reassuring statements or media coverage is no
simple task and is very much dependent on the situation
in question as to whether one believes people should be
alarmed or reassured.
We recognise the time constraints facing television
news journalists as well as the different expectations
that viewers bring and the factors that shape their inter-
pretations of risk. Notwithstanding these factors our
study identifies opportunities where reporting of emer-
ging diseases could be enhanced. While there were daily
tallies of infection rates with commentary on how this
related to changes in the pandemic alert level, there was
little apparent effort to contextualise what the figures
meant. Viewers might hear that pH1N1 had arrived in
Australia, yet still have little understanding of their per-
sonal vulnerability or how the number of infections and
deaths compared with those from other infectious dis-
eases like seasonal ‘flu or whooping cough, which was
also affecting the community at the time [41]. We
suggest that constant updatest oi n f e c t i o nr a t e sc o u l d
be improved by providing commentary that either
(a) would allow a viewer to reach conclusions about
their own level of risk or (b) reiterated useful advice
about reducing infection and contagion at home and in
the community at large, especially given that in other
countries viewers felt infection was inevitable and not
easily preventable [42].
News coverage of pH1N1 as an uncertain and poten-
tially serious risk raised serious challenges for risk com-
munication. With both SARS and avian ‘flu having
recently attracted mass reportage yet not causing any
deaths in Australia, potential “cry wolf” [43] legitimacy
risks faced Australian health authorities. Concerns over
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had proved unwarranted twice before, so further major
public alerts with similar outcomes might engender a
sense of either cynicism or complacency. On the other
hand, authorities risked the charge that they had not
done enough in the event that the disease caused many
deaths. These competing concerns created a challenging
communication context for health authorities and jour-
nalists alike.
It would have been unacceptable for the government
to promote personal risk reduction practices like work-
ing from home, avoiding crowds and discretionary tra-
vel, and the wearing of facemasks if such measures were
unwarranted by the risk assessments available. However,
i tm a yh a v eb e e ns e n s i b l et oa d v i s et h ec o m m u n i t yo f
what situation would need to occur before such mea-
sures would be recommended. Such advice may have
gone some way to promoting greater community under-
standing of the phases of pandemic preparedness.
There was also the difficulty of communicating com-
plex information within the narrow time constraints of
television news, something further compounded by
urging viewers to remain calm while simultaneously
acknowledging that authorities did not have answers to
several questions. Given that a vaccine was not available
throughout this sustained period of uncertain risk com-
munication and that mortality remained low, the poten-
tial for a ‘cry wolf’ affect may have been magnified.
Judging by the frequency of press releases across the
sample period and the frequency with which the health
authorities were available to the media, decisions were
plainly taken that the public should be maximally
informed, despite there being little different to say from
day-to-day in terms of advisories. Almost-daily efforts to
generate news coverage were framed by the media in
terms of updates and developments, mainly focussed on
case increases. For the news media’s part, the commer-
cial imperatives to produce compelling news items to
attract large audiences for their advertisers may have
been tempered by the government’s concern to under-
line the potential seriousness of the disease and journal-
istic notions of socially responsible reportage. The
frequency and volume of news coverage that pH1N1
attracted was, arguably, not reflective of its impact in
the community, and understanding the implications of
this is an area that warrants further investigation.
Conclusions
The Australian government and media acted responsibly
by providing regular, high profile and highly transparent
information on the emerging intelligence about the pan-
demic. Uncertainty about the trajectory of the disease
was openly acknowledged and reassurances given about
government preparedness. Potentially dissonance-
generating news coverage that might have engendered
panic, complacency or cynicism about “yet another epi-
demic” was uncommon. Opportunities were lost to
inform the public about possible future developments
and the personal risk reduction behaviours that might
then be recommended or mandated.
Further research should explore [1] how various pub-
lics decoded and received the information and advice
provided and [2] how journalists approached the chal-
lenges of making this on-going story maximally news-
worthy. Triangulated with content analysis of what was
broadcast, such as this paper, these studies could pro-
vide valuable information for risk communicators in
areas characterised by the uncertainty inherent in emer-
ging diseases.
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